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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (2002). The appeal was transferred to the 
Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are these: 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that LeVangers 
were proper representatives to pursue this derivative 
shareholders' action? 
2. Did the trial court properly hold that a substantial 
benefit was conferred on Highland Estates, sufficient to justify 
the award of attorneys' fees to LeVangers? 
3. Did the trial court err in granting defendant Highland 
Estates' motion for return of garnished funds? 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review on an appeal from the denial of the 
motion for directed verdict on the issues of standing and 
substantial benefit is the same. The parties in whose favor the 
judgment has been rendered, the LeVangers here, are entitled to 
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts. 
Appellants are required to marshall all the evidence and 
demonstrate that all of the evidence in favor of the 
determination is insufficient to support the trial court's 
decision. As the Utah Supreme Court held in Brewer v. Denver & 
Rio Grande W.R.R., 31 P.3d 557, 569 (Utah 2001): 
[T]his standard obligates "the appealing party '[to] 
marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" 
. . . . In other words, demonstrating insufficiency of 
the evidence requires an appealing party to show that 
all the evidence in favor of the verdict "cannot 
support the verdict." 
(citations omitted). 
As regards the appeal from the granting of the Association's 
motion to return garnished funds, the standard of review is one 
of abuse of discretion. Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 
1997). 
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STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is of central 
importance to the Association's appeal, and provides as follows: 
In a derivative action brought by one or more 
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a 
corporation or of an unincorporated association, the 
corporation or association having failed to enforce a 
right which may properly be asserted by it, the 
complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that 
the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time 
of the transaction of which he complains or that his 
share or membership thereafter devolved on him by 
operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a 
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the 
United States which it would not otherwise have. The 
complaint shall also allege with particularity the 
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the 
action he desires from the directors or comparable 
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or 
members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the 
action or for not making the effort. The derivative 
action may not be maintained if it appears that the 
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the shareholders or members similarly 
situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or 
association. The action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the court, and 
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be 
given to shareholders or members in such manner as the 
court directs. 
As regards the LeVangers' cross-appeal, Rule 4-504(1) & (2) 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rules 5(b)(1), 
58A(d), and 64D(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are of 
central importance. They provide, in relevant parts, as follows: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the 
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall within 
fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, 
or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
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(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, 
and orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before 
being presented to the court for signature unless the 
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five days 
after servi ce. 
Rule 4-504(1) & (2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
(b) Service: How made and by whom,., 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is 
required or permitted to be made upon a party 
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made 
upon the attorney unless service upon the party is 
ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or 
upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or by-
mailing a copy to the last known address or. if no 
address i^ WiowT^ - bv "! e^vi na ] t VJ"i t-h the* n"' f-TV: rc t~he 
court: 
( JL Notice cl -jiinii j ;r entry _i judgment 
copy cf the signed judgment: shall be promptly served by 
the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 
5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is nc/ 
affected fc trie requirement cf this provision 
(e • • -~*r'' - ce c f wri r ; r1-. I u. n, genera 1 servi ce 
(pre-judgment or after judgment). The writ, any order 
pursuant to subdivision(s) of this rule, and any order 
pursuant to Rule 64A(3), shall be served upon the 
garnishee by a sheriff, constable, deputy, or such •. 
other person designated by court order and return 
thereof made in the same manner as a return of service 
upon a summons. All other service may be by first class 
mail or hand delivery, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature cf the .!..ise 
This is a -;.e.r vative action brought bv the LeVangers on 
behalf of members of uhe H:"-h:..ana Estates rrcreicies Owners 
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Association similarly situated to seek rescission of the 
Association's execution and recording of amended CC&R's in 1995, 
approved by way of written ballot without benefit of a members 
meeting, as required by law. Not all members of the Association 
were contacted regarding their right to vote on the matter, and 
the proposed amended CC&R's, as presented to the members, was 
revised before recording. This Court overturned the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Association. 
The trial court has ordered the rescission of the amended CC&R's 
and the LeVangers were awarded their attorneys fees following an 
evidentiary hearing. The Association has appealed. 
Following an order of the trial court granting the LeVangers 
their attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting the action, the 
LeVangers garnished from the Association the amount of the award. 
The Association obtained an order from the trial court requiring 
the return of the garnished funds. The LeVangers have appealed. 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs filed their verified complaint January 21, 1997. 
R.9. Defendant Homeowners Association filed its answer February 
26, 1997. R.77. 
Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the decision 
granting summary judgment or to certify the order as final and 
appealable on July 16, 1998. R. 479. The Court denied the 
motion to reconsider and granted the motion to certify the 
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summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) in its Order of 
Marcl ] 3 Il 9 9S I 2 C 5 3 
The LeVangers filed a Notice of Appeal on Maxch 31, 1 999, 
F - ' - • : . - • , • • 
Appeals r y \ r-j* n a t e d May r-, . - unci i . Je-1 '"ay *: 19-9 
1063 . 
The Court of Appeals issued its. opinion April 13, 2000, 
i---"^ ?; : . •. - . I.ding I:hal I lit 
amended CC&R's were illegaiJy adopted by t:;e Homeowner s 
A s s o c :i a t C^ iL-Jl'... il —„_.t * A pp 
2 000) . See Append ix E ro Appe; l a r k ' s H n e : . 
B a s e d *- • • • • t:i :i a ] 
court ordered tne rescission >r .ue amende ^  C C & K ' S an:i t r-e 
LeVangers were awarded their attorneys fees toiiowirv: ui 
evidentiary hearing. D 1 " ] 1556. 
The Court entered its ri]n.na awarimc r : •;* i \r if f s the±r 
attorney; :e°? and costs ^n A>veiui3e i 1[;C;1.-1E;;'5 
B a s e d * ' 'i*- " K~" tr wy. ^ p p ri I ,.> ^  P'air/ i f f.c ri'°v] i*-o ^ 
p : . ^ crj : - - . -. . -^  * ,. i: - :.J - :' a: . . .-iuu ^  ^  .verv on 
November i9, ^  :, :5S6. en November . v, 2 .;, rliinti:fs 
n , . : i .*• , i *• 
S u r m r County •- s L •' 
T • • ' . J? ' 
Order on December . R 3 555, Plai ntiffs' counsel 
pe r sona] ] y coi i t - "• • - ^ : i i r t " s C3 e :n : ] z DI i December 1 1 , ' » 
inquire as to the Judge's availability to sign the Order. R. 
1610-1611. The Clerk informed plaintiffs' counsel that the Order 
had already been signed. R. 1611. 
A Writ of Garnishment, directed to garnishee, Bank One Utah, 
N.A., was duly issued and served upon the garnishee on December 
11, 2001. R. 1570-1576. The Garnishee mailed notice to 
defendant Highland Estates of the garnishment and of defendant's 
rights under Rule 64. R. 1575. The Affidavit of garnishee 
indicated that the Notice was mailed to Highland Estates on 
December 19, 2001. R. 1575. 
Highland Estates knew of the signing of the Order by at 
least December 28, 2001. R. 1597. Defendant filed a Notice of 
Appeal in early January, 2002. R. 1583-1584. Defendant did not 
file a motion to stay collection activities, nor did it file a 
supersedeas bond with the Notice of Appeal. 
The trial court granted the Association's subsequent motion 
seeking return of the garnished funds. R. 1621-1626. 
The Association appeals and the LeVangers cross appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In their verified complaint, the LeVangers alleged, 
with respect to the standing issue: 
1. Plaintiffs bring this action derivatively 
under Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
on behalf of themselves and all other members of 
Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc. 
(''Highland Estates")/ similarly situated, and in the 
right and for the benefit of Highland Estates. 
7 
2, Plaintiffs fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the members similarly situated in 
enforcing the rights of Highland Estates and seek to 
enforce only claims on behalf of Highland Estates which 
management .:.f Highland Estates refuses to pursue, 
Plaintiffs assert no personal claims agai nst Highland 
Estates bv this action. 
3, Plaintiffs have owned a membership interest 
in Highland Estates at all times relevant * - "u~ 
allegations in this Complaint. 
4. This is not a collusive action to confer 
jurisdic. • ^  ^" -b--- ^ 'irt that i t otherwise would i I : t: 
have. 
5. Several demands have been made by the 
plaintiffs on Highland Estates and on the individual 
defendants who are currently members of the Board of 
Trustees of Highland Estates. Defendants have refused 
to take action on the demands. 
2 . 1 : . : - ; • . - . . * -•:. : 
Highland Estates admitted that several demands .-.ad been mac- by 
the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates. 
I \ . 
3. Highland Estates filed a motion, for summary judgment on 
No^ member 2 6 2 9 97 . In :! ts memorandum, Highland Estates argued 
that plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue the action 
derivative! y: 
In the case at hand plaintiffs purport to represent all 
members of Highland Estates. Plaintiffs aire unable to 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
other members because: (] ) the plaintiffs!s sole 
motive for bringing this action was vindication agaii ist 
certain Board members; (2) plaintiffs' personal 
interest substantially outweigh any derivative 
interests; (3) economic antagonism exists between the 
8 
LeVangers and the members; and (4) plaintiffs have 
virtually no support from the other members. 
R. 211-212. 
4. In opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on the standing issue, the LeVangers obtained Affidavits 
from Shelby Jean Ramsdell and Robert G. Blackbourn, Jr., members 
of the Highland Estates Properties Owners Association in support 
of the LeVangers. R. 355-357; 359-362. 
5. Shelby Jean Ramsdell was a member of the Highland 
Estates' Board of Trustees at the time she executed her 
Affidavit. 
R. 360. 
6. Ms. Ramsdell knew of other members who were delinquent 
in payment of their assessments to the Association. R. 360. 
7. Ms. Ramsdell had paid assessments to the Association 
under protest before. R. 360 
8. Ms. Ramsdell agreed with the LeVangers in their 
allegations regarding the unlawful adoption of the amended CC&R's 
in 1994. In her Affidavit she stated: 
11. In 1994 the Association proposed amending the 
CCR's, and I voted against the amendments. 
12. On or about September 19,1996, after an 
annual Property Owners meeting, I voiced my protest to 
Association President regarding the balloting process 
and the length of time the Association took to collect 
ballots to amend the CCR's from August 1994 until they 
were recorded in October 1995. 
R. 361. 
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9. Mr. Blackbourn had been delinquent in his payment of 
assessments to the Association. R. 356. 
10. Mr. Blackbourn agreed with the LeVangers in their 
allegations regarding the unlawful adoption of the amended CC&R's 
in 1994. In his Affidavit he stated: 
The CCR's had a deadline of November 30, 1994. A 
year later votes were still being solicited. The 
Association never voted to extend the vote or take a 
new vote. 
R. 356. 
11. Ms. LeVanger filed an Affidavit in opposition to 
Highland Estates' motion for summary judgment on the issue of the 
LeVangers1 standing to pursue the action derivatively. In it, 
she stated: 
14. Other homeowners agree with my husband and 
me. I was recently elected as a member of 
Association's Board of Trustees. Other Board members 
have voiced complaints similar to mine. I am not 
vindictive toward any Board member. 
R. 372. 
12. The trial court granted Highland Estates' motion for 
summary judgment solely on the issue of the legality of manner by 
which the CC&R's were amended. The trial court denied Highland 
Estates' motion for summary judgment on all other issues, 
including the issue of the LeVangers' lack of standing to pursue 
the action derivatively. 
1. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
is hereby granted in part and denied in part as 
follows: 
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A. All of plaintiffs' claims set forth in 
plaintiffs' Complaint relating to the conduct of the 
members of the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates in 
the manner in which the Amendment to Declaration of 
Restrictive and Protective Covenants was voted on and 
approved are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
as its relates to all other claims in plaintiffs' 
Complaint is hereby denied. 
R. 470-471. 
13. In his ruling on Highland Estate's Motion, the trial 
judge, Judge Nehring, noted that: "I'm at this time denying the 
motion, for lack of a better term, to disqualify the Levangers as 
derivative action claimants, or plaintiffs . . . ." R. 453. 
14. In his ruling on Highland Estate's Motion, the trial 
judge also noted that: 
It is true that there is nothing -- few things -- more 
fundamental to corporations, entities in general, than 
this process by which those entities amend their 
charters or their beginning documents so to speak. 
R. 447. 
15. On July 15, 1998, the LeVangers filed a Motion to 
Reconsider the trial court's partial grant of summary judgment 
relating to the legality of the adoption of the CC&R's. R. 
479-481. 
16. In support of their motion to reconsider, the LeVangers 
obtained affidavits from Christie Bambery and Michael Ferrigno, 
both members of the Highland Estates Properties Owners 
Association. R. 472-474; 475-478. 
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17. Mr. Ferrigno was the then President of Highland Estates 
and a member of the Board of the Association. R. 473. He stated 
in his Affidavit: 
4. I did not vote in 1994 when the Highland 
Estates Properties Owners Association proposed to amend 
the CC&R's for the subdivision because I did not 
receive any notice of the vote. 
5. I did not receive any letters soliciting my 
vote, did not receive copies of the proposed amendments 
to the CC&R's, nor was I given a ballot with which to 
cast my vote. 
6. No one personally came to my house and 
solicited my vote on the amended CC&R's at any time. 
R. 473. 
18. Ms. Bambery stated in her Affidavit: 
10. I share the opinion of the LeVangers, 
plaintiffs herein, that the Board of Trustees has 
operated the Association illegally and in violation of 
the Association's Articles, bylaws and CC&R's. 
R. 476. 
19. At the beginning of the hearing on June 26, 2 001, the 
trial court, Judge Hilder, and counsel for the Association had 
the following exchange: 
THE COURT: Obviously, this case has been 
around a while. I read the Court of Appeals decision 
and I -- I assume they're not -- there's not a lot to 
be said about the underlying summary judgment, as far 
as the election and the validity of the amended CC&Rs. 
That's really not what your objection is, Mr. Belnap. 
It's the fees, it's the issues, of course, about 
probably the benefit and about the reasonableness; is 
that correct? On the evidentiary basis. 
MR. BELNAP: It is, Your Honor. As you know, 
from having the file, we were nine days away from trial 
of this case, and we filed a motion for summary 
judgment. Judge Nehring heard that and granted it 
12 
partially, and that's what the Court of Appeals dealt 
with. There are just some very broad sweeping 
allegations in the Complaint about breach of fiduciary 
duty, and that's the cause of action. And he said, 
"Well, what I'm going to do is -- is -- in talking to 
counsel, he said, "What's this case really about?" And 
counsel said, "Well, it's really about the voting --
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. BELNAP: -- and these CC&Rs." And so he 
said, "Well, I'm going to grant that and then we're 
going to see where that takes us," because Mr. Sheen 
indicated he wanted to take an appeal. And that's 
where we are today. 
So I don't know if there's anything left to try on 
the lawsuit itself, based on that previous discussion 
at the time of summary judgment, but we certainly do 
have a concern which we've raised in our papers about 
benefit, success in the litigation. Also, do the 
LeVangers fairly represent --
THE COURT: Oh, yeah, the derivative. Yeah. 
MR. BELNAP: -- the derivative issue, Judge, and 
then simply on the fees themselves, we don't think that 
there's -- that they meet Utah law's evidentiary 
requirement for the showing. 
THE COURT: You've raised a lot of issues, all 
around the same essential issue of the fees, and they 
seem to be very fact-intensive. 
R. 1634, p. 2-4. 
20. In its ruling of November 27, 2001, the trial court 
held: 
The court agrees that plaintiffs must satisfy the 
substantial benefit test to receive fees, but once it 
is shown that the Association was required to changes 
its practices, and that certain rights of the 
Association members, as asserted by plaintiffs, were 
vindicated, the court cannot say that a substantial 
benefit was not conferred. The extent of the benefit 
is potentially far-reaching, and for the court to 
engage in excessive assessment of the quality of the 
benefit would likely discourage similarly situated 
plaintiffs from taking aggressive action for fear of 
13 
the financial burden if the court found that some, but 
not enough, benefit was conferred in a particular case. 
R. 1552. 
21. At the conclusion of the September 19th hearing, the 
trial court agreed that the LeVangers had not waived the right to 
present evidence on the standing issue, if necessary to preserve 
their right to pursue the action: 
MR. ROBINSON: And I apologize for interrupting, 
but we do need to reserve the standing issue of -- if 
that's -- I mean that --
THE COURT: Well, here's the thing. I don't 
know if it's a big issue or not. What I'm proposing is 
that you each have until a week from Friday, the 28th, 
at 5:00 to file any supplemental brief you want. It 
can include standing, it can include entitlement fees, 
it can include the summary of the testimony on the 
reasonableness and necessity in the way of a closing. 
And, frankly, standing is not an issue or, if it is, it 
may be factual and I'll have to consider another 
hearing. I mean -- but you're not waiving it at this 
time. 
MR. ROBINSON: Right. 
THE COURT: But I may determine, based on the 
brief, that it's not even an issue or I may determine 
we need more, and I could determine, you know, Mr. 
Belnap's right, there's no standing. So I cannot tell 
you. You'll have to make your best argument of what I 
should do with it. 
MR. ROBINSON: I understand. 
R. 1634, p.148. 
22. The Court entered its ruling awarding Plaintiffs their 
attorneys' fees and costs on November 27, 2001. R. 1551-1553. 
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23. Based on the Court's written ruling, Plaintiffs 
provided a proposed Order to defendant Highland Estates by hand 
delivery on November 29, 2001. R. 1556. 
24. On November 29, 2001, Plaintiffs mailed a copy of the 
proposed order to the Clerk of the Court, Summit County. R. 
1554-1556. 
25. The Court, after the time for objection had run, signed 
the Order on December 11, 2001. R. 1555. Plaintiffs' counsel 
personally contacted the Court's Clerk on December 11, 2 001, to 
inquire as to the Judge's availability to sign the Order. R. 
1610-1611. The Clerk informed plaintiffs' counsel that the Order 
had already been signed. R. 1611. 
26. A Writ of Garnishment, directed to garnishee, Bank One 
Utah, N.A., was duly issued and served upon the garnishee on 
December 11, 2001. R. 1570-1576. The Garnishee mailed notice to 
defendant Highland Estates of the garnishment and of defendant's 
rights under Rule 64. R. 1575. 
27. The Affidavit of garnishee indicated that the Notice 
was mailed to Highland Estates on December 19, 2001. R. 1575. 
28. Highland Estates knew of the signing of the Order by at 
least December 28, 2001. 
29. The trial court granted the Association's subsequent 
motion seeking return of the garnished funds. R. 1621-1626. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The LeVangers, on behalf of all members of the Association, 
contested the methods employed by the Board of the Association to 
amend the CC&R's affecting the members' property. The trustees 
chose to employ a mail-in balloting process, inventing new rules 
or ignoring established rules of corporate governance as it 
suited their purposes in allegedly obtaining approval for the 
amended CC&R's. Their methods were fatally defective --no 
record date for members entitled to vote was established; notice 
of the altered method for approving the amendments was not 
provided to all members; the deadline for voting was unilaterally 
extended, without advance notice; property owners who became such 
only after the voting process began were allowed to cast ballots; 
voting tallies were improperly kept. 
In its appeal, the Association has not marshalled all the 
evidence from the record that supports the trial court's 
determination that the LeVangers are proper representatives and 
entitled to their fees. The LeVangers have standing to pursue 
this action, since the adequacy of LeVangers representation of 
the other members of the Association has been previously 
resolved. The Association has the burden of establishing that 
the LeVangers are inadequate representatives and it has not met 
its burden. Alternatively, the Association has waived the 
standing issue since it has not objected to the award of 
substantive relief to the LeVangers. 
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At the very least, the LeVangers are entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of their standing as adequate 
representatives since they preserved the issue with the trial 
court. 
The LeVangers, through their derivative action, have 
conferred a substantial benefit on the Association and its 
Members by this action. Maintaining the integrity of the voting 
process is a substantial benefit, as is reaffirming the in-person 
meeting process, and enforcing strict compliance by the 
Association and its Board with applicable statute. 
The Association is not entitled to the return of garnished 
funds. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Association Has Not Marshalled All the Evidence. 
As this Court has noted: 
[I]in order to challenge a trial court's findings of 
fact on appeal, the challenger "must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings in question." . . . We will 
uphold the trial court's findings of fact if a party 
fails to appropriately marshal all of the evidence. . . 
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence 
but has merely recited the findings on point and then 
highlighted the evidence which he deems contrary to the 
findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial 
court's findings and affirm the awards on appeal. 
Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2 508, 516 (Utah Ct.App. 1996). 
Here, as in Marshall, all the Association has done is recite 
the evidence in the record it contends does not support the trial 
court's conclusion. The Association must deal with the evidence 
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in the record, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, that supports the trial court's decision, and 
demonstrate how that evidence remains insufficient to justify the 
trial court's decision. 
Particularly, as regards the trial court's conclusion that 
Judge Nehring did reach the merits of the standing issue and 
effectively held that the LeVangers had standing. The 
Association does nothing to marshall all the evidence that would 
support such a conclusion by the trial court. 
As indicated in the LeVangers' statement of facts herein, 
there is ample evidence to support the trial court's decision. 
This Court need only review the facts set forth above, 
particularly paragraphs 4 through 18 to understand how far short 
the Association has fallen in marshalling all the evidence. 
II. The LeVangers Have Standing to Pursue This Action. 
The LeVangers standing to pursue this action is limited to 
the issue of the adequacy of their representation of the other 
members of the Association similarly situated. The issue has 
been previously resolved or, in the alternative, the Association 
has waived the issue. In any event, and just as importantly, it 
is the Association's burden to establish that the LeVangers are 
inadequate representatives. 
A. The Adequacy of LeVangers Representation of the 
Other Shareholders Has Been Previously Resolved. 
The LeVangers have alleged and proven their right to 
represent all property owners similarly situated in prosecuting 
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this action. On at least two occasions, the Association's motion 
attacks on the adequacy of plaintiffs' representation have been 
rejected. 
Defendant first attempted to attack the adequacy of 
plaintiffs' representation in connection with its motion for 
summary judgment in 1998. Most of the written material, the 
memoranda, the affidavits and the oral argument in the hearing on 
January 6, 1998 dealt with the adequacy of representation. The 
Association argued the alleged inadequacy of representation on 
four bases: 
(1) the plaintiffsfs sole motive for bringing this 
action was vindication against certain Board members; 
(2) plaintiffs' personal interest substantially 
outweigh any derivative interests; (3) economic 
antagonism exists between the LeVangers and the 
members; and (4) plaintiffs have virtually no support 
from the other members. 
R. 211-212. 
The trial court rejected all of the Association's 
contentions and the issue of standing and it lost. Judge Nehring 
determined that the Association had failed to meet its burden of 
challenging the adequacy of the LeVangers' representation and 
denied the Association's motion to disqualify plaintiffs as 
adequate representatives. 
Such a result is not surprising. The Association offered no 
evidence of the LeVangers' personal animosity toward any 
particular Board member as being the determining factor in 
bringing this action. This Court, as the trial court did, need 
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look no further than the fact that though individual Board 
members were named as defendants for procedural purposes, no 
action has been pursued against individual members of the Board. 
The LeVangers personal interests are no different than any 
other member of the Association --to correct the Association's 
methods of operation and prevent the Association from trampling 
on members rights to be heard and cast informed votes, and to 
prevent the Association and its Board from acting contrary to the 
Association's charter documents, including the CC&R's, and state 
statutes. 
As for economic antagonism, the record is clear that the 
LeVangers were not unique in their protests over assessments. 
Other members were upset with the assessment process, had paid 
assessments under protest, and had been delinquent in the payment 
of assessments. 
No where is the Association's failure to discredit the 
LeVangers more hollow than when it contends, as it continues to 
do to this very day, that no other members support the LeVangers 
in their pursuit of justice for members of the Association. Many 
members, including Board members and a President of the 
Association, both elected by the members, signed Affidavits 
supportive of the LeVangers and their attempts to require the 
Association to act within the law. Ms. LeVanger, herself, was 
elected a Board member during the pendency of the present action! 
The facts clearly establish that many other members are so 
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supportive of the LeVangers in the present case that they will 
sign Affidavits on their behalf and will elect one of the 
LeVangers to serve on the Board of Trustees. 
B. Highland Estates Has the Burden of Establishing 
that the LeVangers are Inadequate Representatives, and Did 
Not Meet Their Burden. 
The law is clear that the Association has the burden of 
establishing that the LeVangers are inadequate representatives of 
the members of the Association. See, e.g., Riggin v. Rea Riggin 
& Sons, Inc., 738 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) 
(M[F]ederal courts interpreting F.R.C.P. 23.1 have held that the 
burden should rest with the defendant to show that the plaintiff 
is not a fair and adequate representative"); Schneider v. 
Austin, 94 F.R.D. 44 (1982) ("Defendants bear the burden of 
demonstrating inadequate representation"). See also, Gottlieb v. 
Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1014 (10th Cir. 1993): 
Unlike class actions under Rule 23, in shareholder 
derivative suits under Rule 23.1, a preliminary 
affirmative determination that the named plaintiffs 
will fairly and adequately represent the interests of 
the other class members is not a prerequisite to the 
maintenance of the action. Rather, the rule provides 
only that the derivative suit may not be maintained if 
it appears that the named shareholder does not fairly 
and adequately represent the other shareholders. 
The Association has failed to carry its burden. It failed 
in its original motion for summary judgment before the trial 
court, and it failed during the September 19th hearing. 
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III. The Association Has Waived the Standing Issue. 
The adequacy of plaintiffs' representation was recognized by 
the parties on the prior appeal. Plaintiffs and defendant 
addressed the Utah Court of Appeals and acknowledged without 
qualification to the Court of Appeals that the case before the 
court was a "derivative action." ("This is a derivative action 
brought by plaintiffs . . . ." Appellant's Brief at 3. "This is 
an action brought by Jean and Rebecca LeVanger, as a derivative 
action . . . ." Appellee's Brief at 3.) Nothing in the parties' 
briefs or in oral argument asserted that the adequacy of 
plaintiff's representation had not been resolved in the trial 
court. 
The defendant attempted again to attack the plaintiffs' 
adequacy as representatives in response to plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment before this court following the appellate 
decision. In memoranda and in oral argument, plaintiffs argued 
then that the issue of adequate representation had been 
previously resolved. On June 26, 2001, this Court rejected 
defendant's contention and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment. The Court ordered that the 1995 Amended CC&R's be 
rescinded and a recording to that effect be made. The Court 
could not have issued its order of June 26, 2001, if the 
plaintiffs were inadequate representatives to prosecute the 
action. The Court reserved for later hearing only attorney fees, 
i.e., reasonableness of plaintiffs' fees and the benefit 
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conferred to the extent that issue bore on the reasonableness of 
those fees. 
The entire tenor of the Association's arguments before the 
trial court at the June 2 6th and September 19th hearings was that 
the only remaining issue before the trial court was the 
LeVangers' request for fees. Right at the beginning of the first 
hearing, the Court began by outlining the remaining issues, and 
counsel for the Association agreed: 
THE COURT: [T]here's not a lot to be said 
about the underlying summary judgment, as far as the 
election and the validity of the amended CC&Rs. That's 
really not what your objection is, Mr. Belnap. It's 
the fees, it's the issues, of course, about probably 
the benefit and about the reasonableness; is that 
correct? On the evidentiary basis. 
MR. BELNAP: It is, Your Honor. 
R. 1634, p. 2. 
Later on, the Association conceded that the substantive 
relief requested in the LeVangers' lawsuit, should be granted by 
the trial court based on the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
LeVanger, 3 P.3d 187: "So I don't know if there's anything left 
to try on the lawsuit itself, based on that previous discussion 
at the time of the summary judgment." R. 1634, p. 3. 
The Court also indicated the LeVangers were entitled to 
substantive relief. "What's your opinion on that, Mr. Sheen? 
And I think you get your summary judgment on the underlying 
issues. I cannot imagine why you wouldn't. And I guess, in the 
formal matter, what the Court of Appeals gave you." R. 1634, p. 
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4. The Association did not object that substantive relief should 
be granted and that the Association should rescind its amended 
CC&R's. 
At the Sept. 19th hearing, the Association reiterated that 
there was nothing more to litigate in this case than the fees 
requested and the form of the eventual Order on the rescission of 
the amended CC&R's, based on the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
MR. BELNAP: If there's nothing left to litigate 
in the Complaint other than the fees and then the form 
of orders, the separate issues that we have submitted, 
or can submit orders on, Judge, which we have them here 
today that we've each prepared --
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BELNAP: -- then I think that resolves it 
and we're ready to go. 
R. 1634, p. 18. 
The Association raised the standing argument in the 
September 19th hearing solely for the purpose of defeating the 
LeVangers attempt to recover their fees in the derivative action. 
"MR. BELNAP: Under Rule 23, the plaintiffs have to establish to 
this Court that they have standing. That issue was not decided 
below [sic] and remains a threshold issue for this Court to 
determine with respect to whether they recover attorneys fees." 
R. 1634, p. 29. 
Similar attempts to resurrect t. standing issue at late 
stages of a proceeding have been rejected by the courts. Thus, 
in In Re Cendant Corporation Litigation, 264 F.3d 201, 251-52 
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(3rd Cir. 2001), the court held that the defendants waived their 
objections to class certification: 
The Davidsons first argue that the District Court 
erred by failing to make explicit findings that all of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's requirements were 
met when certifying the Class. . . . In their Reply 
Brief, the Davidsons add the argument that Rule 23(a)'s 
commonality requirement was not met as well. However, 
the Davidsons neglected to raise these arguments in a 
timely fashion, failing to raise them until the 
settlement approval stage. We thus conclude that they 
waived these arguments by not raising them earlier. See 
Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that objectors to a class action settlement 
who argued, at the settlement approval stage, that the 
Rule 23 requirements were not met for them in their 
subclass were untimely with their objection, and thus 
the objection was waived). 
Having agreed that the LeVanger's were entitled to the 
affirmative relief sought in the action, the Associaition waived 
its right to subsequently contest the adequacy of the LeVangers 
representation of other members of the Association similarly 
situated. 
IV. The LeVangers Are Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing on 
the Issue of Their Standing as Adequate Representatives. 
Should this Court rule that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the trial court's determination that the LeVangers 
have standing to pursue this action, the LeVangers are entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing to establish, once and for all, their 
right to pursue this action derivatively. 
The trial court noted, at the conclusion of the last hearing 
in this matter, that the LeVangers would be entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing if the issue came down to the sufficiency of 
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the evidence supporting the adequacy of the LeVangers 
representation of other members similarly situated in the 
Assocaiation: "[THE COURT:] [S]tanding is not an issue or, if 
it is, it may be factual and I'll have to consider another 
hearing. I mean -- but you're [the LeVangers] not waiving it at 
this time." R. 1634, at p. 148. 
V. A Substantial Benefit Has Been Conferred on the 
Association and its Members by this Action, 
The LeVangers are entitled to their attorneys' fees for 
having conferred a substantial benefit on the Association and its 
members. 
"In a stockholder's derivative action, when the stockholder 
confers a substantial benefit upon the corporation, the 
stockholder bringing the derivative action is entitled to recover 
a reasonable attorney fee from the corporation." American Family 
Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053, 1062 (Ala. 1990). 
Courts have had numerous opportunities to define the scope 
of the "substantial benefit" that must be conferred on the 
corporation to justify an award of attorneys fees. In American 
Family Care, the trial court imposed a constructive trust on 15% 
of the company's outstanding shares to remedy a breach of the 
duty of loyalty by a principal in the company. The Supreme Court 
of Alabama upheld an award of attorneys' fees, agreeing that a 
substantial benefit had been conferred on the corporation. In 
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970), the 
United States Supreme Court held that, "in vindicating the 
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statutory policy [regarding proxy solicitations], petitioners 
have rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its 
shareholders. . . . [R]egardless of the relief granted, private 
stockholders1 actions of this sort 'involve corporate 
therapeutics,1 and furnish a benefit to all shareholders . . . ." 
See also, In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders 
Litigation, 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 96,585, at 92,746 (Del. Ch. 
1991) (claims asserted in derivative action were "very weak," 
settlement "provided speculative benefits to the class," 
including ten day extension of tender offer and limitation of 
allowable expenses; attorneys' fees and costs of $275,000 
awarded); Martin v. F.S. Payne Co., 569 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1991) 
(judgment gave disinterested shareholders a right to vote to 
invalidate insider stock purchase; fees and costs awarded even 
though stockholders subsequently approved insider purchase 
terms); Scott v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 477 N.E.2d 553, 563 
(Ind. App. 1985) (derivative action sought declaratory judgment 
on proper interpretation of corporation charter; all fees and 
costs awarded); Lewis v. Anderson, 692 F.2d 1267, 1270-71 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (derivative action challenged validity of stock option 
grants; company obtained shareholder ratification of grants after 
lawsuit was filed; all fees and costs of derivative action 
awarded); Neese v. Richer, 428 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ind. App. 1981) 
(shareholder in derivative action had lost on issues of 
mismanagement, fraud and conversion of assets but had won on 
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request for accounting; all fees and costs awarded). Wright and 
Miller have noted that f![t]he trend appears to be to allow 
reimbursement [of a derivative plaintiff's attorneys fees and 
costs] whenever the action furthers the objectives of the 
derivative suit procedure or the policies of any applicable 
substantive law." FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1841, at 205 (2d 
ed. 1986) (footnote omitted). 
As the Court of Appeals of Indiana noted, in DRW Builders, 
Inc. v. Richardson, 679 N.E.2d 902 (1997), "because the 
corporation is the beneficiary of the recovery of funds or of the 
corrective benefit of a derivative action, the corporation bears 
the expense of attorneys' fees in shareholder derivative suits." 
(citation omitted; emphasis added). 
A. Maintaining the Integrity of the Voting Process is 
a Substantial Benefit. 
Courts have held that upholding a shareholder's right to 
vote is a substantial benefit, in and of itself. The Federal 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Amalgamated Clothing 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, 54 F.3d 69, 70 (1995), noted that: "the 
right to cast an informed vote, in and of itself, is a 
substantial interest worthy of vindication." In that case, the 
court upheld an award of attorney's fees for the deriviative 
plaintiffs, holding "that the promotion of corporate suffrage 
regarding a significant policy issue confers a substantial 
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benefit regardless of the percentage of votes cast for or against 
the proposal at issue." Id. 
All of the judges who have considered the issue in this 
action have noted how fundamentally important it is to maintain 
the integrity of the voting process in a corporation, 
particularly as regards amending charter documents. The CC&R's 
for a homeowners' association are at least as critical and 
fundamental to its operation as are its Articles and Bylaws. 
The trial court in the matter now before the Court, even 
while ruling against the LeVangers on the propriety of the manner 
in which the Association's CC&R's were amended, noted: "It is 
true that there is nothing -- few things -- more fundamental to 
corporations, entities in general, than this process by which 
those entities amend their charters or their beginning documents 
so to speak." R. 241. 
This Court also noted, in its prior opinion in this action, 
that: "The statutory and by-law provisions requiring that action 
by members of a nonprofit corporation be taken only at a duly 
convened meeting protect the interests of the members of the 
association; strict compliance with these provisions is therefore 
required." LeVanger, 3 P.3d at 191. 
B. Reaffirming the In-Person Meeting Process is a 
Substantial Benefit. 
Courts have uniformly held that upholding the integrity of 
the face-to-face meeting process is a substantial benefit, 
warranting attorneys' fee recovery. Thus, in Amalgamated, 54 
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F.3d at 71, the Second Circuit held: "The district court 
identified the facilitation of communication among shareholders 
and between shareholders and management as a substantial interest 
that was vindicated by plaintiffs' action. We agree." 
Similarly, in the present action, this Court has already 
noted the importance of complying with the Association's charter 
documents in conducting shareholders' meetings. In LeVanger, 3 
P.3d at 190 and 191, this Court noted: 
We conclude the present case raises the same concerns. 
The Act's requirement that Association members act only 
at a duly called meeting protects the rights of the 
members and is therefore for their benefit. See id. 
The Association included a similar protection in its 
by-laws, which, like the Act, contemplate actions taken 
only at a duly constituted meeting of Association 
members. That by-law, like the Act, protects the 
Association's members by requiring that member actions 
be taken at member meetings where free discussion and 
dissent can be heard. Absent a meeting, the 
homeowners' consent must be unanimous. 
C. Enforcing Strict Compliance with Statute 
is a Substantial Benefit. 
The Association and its Board has always maintained that 
their actions were taken in good faith and were substantially 
complaint with the law. This Court noted that substantial 
compliance sufficient: "We conclude that, because the voting 
procedures protect the members' interests, they are mandatory 
rather than directory and therefore strict compliance is 
required. Because the mail-in balloting procedure did not comply 
strictly with either the Act or the Association's by-laws, we 
conclude it was ineffectual." Id. at 191. 
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The Association apparently has not even yet understood that 
admonition (strict compliance), as it maintains in its Brief that 
the recent changes to the non-profit corporation act allowing for 
mail-in balloting suggest their prior actions were not so bad. 
The Association's open-ended mail-in balloting process to amend 
the CC&R's, with fixed deadlines far beyond the pall of the 
statute, with selective mailings and member contacts (and lack 
thereof), with extension of the announced deadline without notice 
to members, and counting votes with no consideration to who the 
record shareholders were, has no relationship whatsoever to any 
legitimate balloting process, even though some process of 
balloting is now recognized by statute. The Association would 
also continue to ignore its own charter documents, even though 
this Court went to pains to point out that both the statute then 
in effect and the Association's bylaws contemplated in-person 
meetings. 
VI. The Association is not Entitled to the Return 
of Garnished Funds. 
The LeVangers fully complied with Rule 4-504 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration as it relates to providing the 
Association a copy of the proposed Order relating to the granting 
of the LeVangers1 motion to be awarded their fees. The 
Association had an opportunity to object. The Association was 
given a copy of the proposed Order in advance of its being 
submitted to the Court for signature. 
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The LeVangers' counsel intended to obtain the Courtfs 
signature on the Order on December 11, 2001, but discovered the 
Order had already been signed when he went to the court clerk's 
office in Park City. All of the time requirements of the rule 
were followed. The trial court, on its own, and apparently 
computing the deadlines independent of either of the parties, 
executed the form of the Order in advance of anyone's request. 
Rule 5 was fully complied with as it relates to the Writ of 
Garnishment and related papers. Rule 64D provides the notice 
requirements, and the Association received actual and proper 
notice of the garnishment, through the mailing made to it by the 
garnishee. There is no requirement that the Associations's 
counsel also be given notice. Rule 5 requires either that 
counsel or the party to the action receive notice, which the 
party did in this case. Post-judgment matters, certainly as 
regards collection, are routinely directed to the party in the 
action, not party's counsel. Each of the rules regarding 
post-judgment activities allows for personal service of the party 
to the action. For example, Rule 69 regarding writs of execution 
provides personal service on the judgment debtor "in the same 
manner as service of a summons in a civil action." Rule 69(g), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See also, Lincoln Benefit Life 
Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah 
Crt. App. 1992) (personal service of the individual defendant in 
the action, Hogle, with orders in supplemental proceedings and 
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bench warrants). In garnishment proceedings, notice is proper 
when the garnishee mails the garnishment papers to the party, 
which was done in this case. It is uncontested the Association 
received the garnishment papers. It simply neglected to go to 
its mailbox and get them. 
Given a similar situation, the Utah Court of Appeals, in 
Lincoln Benefit Life, supra, held that: 
Notwithstanding the argument that Lincoln and Allstate 
failed to give notice, Hogle received notice of the 
default judgment on July 18, 1990, when he was 
personally served with the court's order in 
supplemental proceedings. This notice, which Hogle 
received approximately seven weeks after the court 
entered default judgment, provided him adequate 
opportunity to timely move to set aside the default 
j udgment. 
Likewise, here, defendant had adequate opportunity to pursue 
any or all of the remedies noted above upon learning the judgment 
had been entered. 
The notice requirement of Rule 58A with regard to the 
executed Order from Court's November ruling was not followed, but 
there was absolutely no detriment to the Association. The 
Association had actual knowledge of the execution of the Order no 
later than December 28, 2001, according to counsel's own 
admission. The Association had the ability to pursue one or more 
of the following legal remedies thereafter: (1) request for 
reconsideration of its objections or of the Court's Order; (2) 
motion to stay collection activities pending appeal; or, (3) 
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filing of supersedeas bond with the filing of the appeal. 
Defendant elected not to pursue any of those remedies. 
The trial court abused in discretion in ordering the return 
of garnished funds, and its decision should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision to award the LeVangers their 
attorneys fees is correct and should be upheld. 
The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the return 
of garnished funds and should be reversed. 
DATED: January 10, 2 0 03. 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, no addendum to Appellee's Brief is necessary. 
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